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THE FIGHT TO FRAME PRIVACY
Woodrow Hartzog*
NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND
SECURITY. By Daniel J. Solove. New Haven and London: Yale Uni-
versity Press. 2011. Pp. ix, 210. Cloth, $25; paper, $18.
INTRODUCTION
The resolution of a debate often hinges on how the problem being de-
bated is presented. In communication, sociology, psychology, and related
disciplines, this method of issue presentation is known as framing. 1 Framing
theory holds that even small changes in the presentation of an issue or event
can produce significant changes of opinion.2 For example, people are more
willing to tolerate rallies by controversial hate groups when such rallies are
framed as free speech issues, rather than disruptions of the public order.'
Consider two questions: As guardians of civil rights, how should judges
protect our privacy against the ever-increasing scope of government surveil-
lance? When should judges defer to other branches of government that are
better suited to understand when surveillance is necessary to ensure our na-
tional security? While these questions are constructed differently, disputes
involving privacy and security can utilize either one. Yet the interchangeabil-
ity of these questions should not be taken to mean that their construction is
neutral. Indeed, the choice of which question to ask may predetermine the
outcome of the dispute.
* Assistant Professor, Cumberland School of Law at Samford University; Affiliate
Scholar, Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law School. The author would like to
thank Brannon Denning, Daniel Kreiss, Vance Ricks, Ryan Calo, Neil Richards, Danielle
Citron, Cathy Packer, and Daniel Solove for their helpful comments.
1. See, e.g., ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS (1974); Robert D. Benford & David
A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment, 26 ANN.
REV. Soc. 611, 614 (2000); Dennis Chong & James N. Druckman, Framing Theory, 10 ANN.
REV. POL. ScI. 103, 104 (2007); Laura E. Drake & William A. Donohue, Communicative
Framing Theory in Conflict Resolution, 23 COMM. RES. 297, 300 (1996); Daniel Kahneman &
Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 341 (1984); Debo-
rah Tannen, What's in a Frame? Surface Evidence for Underlying Expectations, in FRAMING
IN DISCOURSE 14, 15 (Deborah Tannen ed., 1993); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The
Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981).
2. See, e.g., Thomas E. Nelson et al., Toward a Psychology of Framing Effects, 19
POL. BEHAV. 221, 224 (1997) ("Frames can be meaningful and important determinants of
public opinion.").
3. Thomas E. Nelson et al., Media Framing of a Civil Liberties Conflict and Its Effect
on Tolerance, 91 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 567 (1997). Another author provides this example: "[A]n
80 percent chance to survive a medical operation may mean something different to a consumer
than a 20 percent chance to die on the operating table, even though these two 'frames' convey
mathematically equivalent information." Richard L. Hasen, Efficiency Under Informational
Asymmetry: The Effect of Framing on Legal Rules, 38 UCLA L. REV. 391, 393 (1990).
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Judges, lawmakers, and the public all use and are influenced by frames.4
This influence is particularly important in the battle for privacy and security.
To date, the dominant frame pits security against privacy. Those who sup-
port government collection and analysis of personal information in the name
of security often justify any accompanying threats to privacy with some
form of the argument, "I've got nothing to hide." This statement implies that
privacy is only needed if a person is concealing wrongdoing. By this ac-
count, privacy must yield to security measures because privacy appears less
justified than security.5
In his important new book, Nothing to Hide: The False Tradeoff Between
Privacy and Security, Daniel Solove6 argues that if we continue to view priva-
cy and security as diametrically opposed to each other, privacy will always
lose. Solove argues that the predetermined abandonment of privacy in securi-
ty-related disputes means that the structure of the privacy-security debate is
inherently flawed. Solove understands that privacy is far too vital to our free-
dom and democracy to accept its inevitable demise.
The central thesis of this Review is that Solove's polemic is a strong and
desperately needed collection of frames that counterbalances the "nothing to
hide" argument and other refrains so often used in privacy disputes. Nothing
to Hide is succinct and accessible. In his ambitious quest to concisely re-
spond to a wide range of problems, however, Solove risks leaving the reader
unsatisfied, wanting more details about his proposals to untangle the tension
between privacy and security.7 Yet this critique does not detract from the
4. See, e.g., Judith D. Fischer, Got Issues? An Empirical Study About Framing Them, 6
J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 1, 3 (2009) ("Researchers have applied framing theory
to show that frames affect how people see issues. This analysis has helped politicians influ-
ence public opinion by skillfully framing ideas. Similarly, a skillfully framed issue statement
can help shape a court's perceptions of an appellate case." (footnotes omitted)); Chris Guthrie,
Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1115, 1128 (2003)
("[F]raming can negatively influence judicial intervention in settlement talks."); Jonathan
Remy Nash & Stephanie M. Stem, Property Frames, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 449 (2010); Cass
R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1556, 1559 (2004);
Daniel M. Isaacs, Note, Baseline Framing in Sentencing, 121 YALE L.J. 426 (2011).
5. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
245, 251 (2008) ("Privacy is the terrorist's best friend. ... "); Richard A. Posner, The Right of
Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 398 (1978) ("At some point nondisclosure becomes fraud."); see
also STEWART A. BAKER, SKATING ON STILTS: WHY WE AREN'T STOPPING TOMORROW'S
TERRORISM (2010); AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY (1999).
6. John Marshall Harlan Research Professor of Law, The George Washington Univer-
sity Law School.
7. Solove concedes this point, explaining that his focus is on general arguments and
principles instead of technical minutiae. P. vii ("Of course, the details are important, but even
more important are the basic concepts and themes of this debate."). For a more technical
treatment of some of the issues in the book, Solove recommends his previous scholarly work
on the topic. See Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75 U. CHI.
L. REV. 343 (2008); Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 112 (2007); Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr's
Misguided Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747 (2005); Daniel J. Solove,
Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511 (2010); Daniel J. Solove, "I've Got
Nothing to Hide" and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745
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importance of this book as a collection of frames to counter a popular narra-
tive in the privacy and security debate.
Part I of this Review discusses the central arguments of the book by ex-
amining frames that are contrary to the commonly adopted narratives.
Instead of reviewing the numerous arguments in the order in which they
appear in the book, this Review consolidates the arguments into groups of
frames, such as the "judges as guardians" frame, the "privacy as a societal
value" frame, and the "fruitless focus" frame.
Part II addresses some of the "security side" arguments that deserve
more attention, including the framing of proposed security measures as fea-
sible or works in progress that must be deployed in order to be improved on.
Part III proposes several additional frames that support the basic premise of
Nothing to Hide, including confidentiality, obscurity, and the commonalities
between privacy and security.
I. NOTHING TO HIDE
Nothing to Hide attempts to address four main concerns and is organized
accordingly in four parts: (1) how lawmakers and the public should assess
and balance the values of privacy and security; (2) how the law should ad-
dress matters of national security; (3) how the Constitution should protect
privacy; and (4) how the law should cope with changing technology. The
book is designed so that one can read the chapters independently of one an-
other.
This book has been published at a time when the debate regarding privacy
and security seems more prominent than ever. Multiple privacy-related stat-
utes have been proposed in Congress,8 and Congress has held multiple
hearings on the state of privacy.9 The media have devoted substantial attention
(2007); Daniel J. Solove, Melville's Billy Budd and Security in Times of Crisis, 26 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2443 (2005); Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1264 (2004).
8. See e.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act Modernization Act of 2012, H.R.
6339, 112th Cong. (2012) (proposed by Rep. Nadler and Rep. Conyers); Protect America's
Privacy Act of 2012, S. 3515, 112th Cong. (2012) (proposed by Sen. Merkley); Electronic
Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011, S. 1011, 112th Cong. (2011) (pro-
posed by Sen. Leahy); Do-Not-Track Online Act of 2011, S. 913, 112th Cong. (2011)
(proposed by Sen. Rockefeller); Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, S. 799, 112th
Cong. (2011) (proposed by Sen. Kerry and Sen. McCain); see also EPIC Bill Track Tracking
Privacy, Speech, and Cyber-Liberties Bills in the 111th Congress, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY IN-
FORMATION CENTER, http://epic.org/privacy/bill_track.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2012).
9. See, e.g., What Facial Recognition Technology Means for Privacy and Civil Liber-
ties: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Privacy, Tech. & the Law of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2012); Protecting Mobile Privacy: Your Smartphones, Tablets, Cell
Phones and Your Privacy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Privacy, Tech. & the Law of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2012); The Electronic Communications Privacy Act:
Government Perspectives on Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011); The State of Online Consumer Privacy: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, & Transp., 112th Cong. (2011).
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to the importance and erosion of privacy in the information age.' 0 A number
of high-profile privacy violations-including invasive body scanners at air-
ports, the massive scope of government surveillance of internet and phone
communications, and large-scale data breaches involving personal infor-
mation-have impacted enormous segments of the American public."l How
people frame all of these issues affects how the issues are debated.
A. A Brief Exploration of Framing
Framing offers a way to articulate the "power of a communicating
text.""2 According to Robert Entman, "To frame is to select some aspects of
a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in
such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpreta-
tion, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item
described."' 3 By increasing the salience of certain bits of information,
frames enhance the probability that receivers will perceive the information
in a certain way, discern a particular meaning, and process it accordingly. 4
While frames do not guarantee an influence on audience thinking,
frames that comport with the existing schemata in a receiver's belief system
can be particularly effective.15 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky offered
what is now likely the most well-known example of how framing works by
highlighting some features while omitting others. 16 In an experiment, the
researchers asked test subjects the following hypothetical:
10. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, How Privacy Vanishes Online, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2010, at
Al, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/17/technology/17privacy.html; Jeffrey Rosen, The Web
Means the End of Forgetting, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2010, at MM30, http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-t2.html; What They Know, WALL ST. J., http://
online.wsj.com/public/page/what-they-know-digital-pivacy.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2012).
11. See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau, Wireless Firms Are Flooded by Requests to Aid Surveillance,
N.Y TIMES, July 8, 2012, at Al, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/09/us/cell-carriers-see-uptick-
in-requests-to-aid-surveillance.html; James Bamford, The NSA Is Building the Country's
Biggest Spy Center (Watch What You Say), WIRED (Mar. 15, 2012, 7:24 PM), http://
www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/03/ff_nsadatacenter/all/l; Sean Gallagher, Data Breaches
Increasingly Caused by Hacks, Malicious Attacks, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 20, 2012, 1:33 PM),
http://arstechnica.com/business/2012/03/data-breaches-increasingly-caused-by-hacks-malicious-
attacks/; Whole Body Imaging Technology and Body Scanners ("Backscatter" X-Ray and
Millimeter Wave Screening), ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CENTER, http://epic.org/privacy/
airtravel/backscatter/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2012); Chronology of Data Breaches: Security
Breaches 2005-Present, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.privacyrights.org/data-
breach (last updated Oct. 21, 2012).
12. Robert M. Entman, Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm, J.
COMM., Autumn 1993, at 51, 51.
13. Id. at 52 (italics omitted).
14. Id. at 53.
15. Id. at 53-54 ("The notion of framing thus implies that the frame has a common
effect on large portions of the receiving audience, though it is not likely to have a universal
effect on all.").
16. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 1.
[Vol. 111:1021
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Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian
disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to
combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific
estimates of the programs are as follows:
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved....
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people
will be saved and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved....
Which of the two programs would you favor? 7
Here, 72% chose Program A.'8 Kahneman and Tversky followed this exper-
iment with another that offered mathematically identical options for treating
the same situation, but the programs were framed in terms of likely deaths
rather than lives saved:
If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die ....
If Program D is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody will
die and a two-thirds probability that 600 people will die.'
9
With this alternative framing, 22% chose Program C, even though 72% of
the previous experimental group selected Program A, Program C's mathe-
matical twin. 21 In short, the alternative framing resulted in a reversal of the
percentages.
In discussing this famous experiment, Entman stated, "As this example
vividly illustrates, the frame determines whether most people notice and
how they understand and remember a problem, as well as how they evaluate
and choose to act upon it."'2' Perhaps one of the most important functions of
frames is that by calling attention to particular aspects of a described reality,
they, by construction, direct attention away from other facets.2 According to
Entman, this logical sleight of hand means that "[m]ost frames are defined
by what they omit as well as include, and the omissions of potential problem
definitions, explanations, evaluations, and recommendations may be as criti-
cal as the inclusions in guiding the audience.
23
17. Id. at 343.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. Conversely, 78 percent of respondents chose Program D even though previously
28 percent chose Program D's clone, Program B. Kahneman and Tversky gave members of
both experimental groups only two treatment options from which to choose. Id.
21. Entman, supra note 12, at 54.
22. Id.
23. Id.; see also Murray Edelman, Contestable Categories and Public Opinion, 10 POL.
COMM. 231, 232 (1993) ("The character, causes, and consequences of any phenomenon be-
come radically different as changes are made in what is prominently displayed, what is
repressed and especially in how observations are classified .... [Tlhe social world is ... a
kaleidoscope of potential realities, any of which can be readily evoked by altering the ways in
which observations are framed and categorized.").
1025April 20131
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The omissions of the current framing of the privacy and security debate
are what motivate Nothing to Hide (p. 24). Framing the debate in terms of
security versus privacy ignores many alternative aspects of the reality of the
debate. Courts, legislators, scholars, attorneys, and the media fixate on ques-
tions of whether privacy should be protected, at the expense of novel
approaches as to how privacy should be protected (p. 3). The more this nar-
rative continues, the more entrenched it becomes. Thus, the framing of a
debate is not an insignificant matter.24 The choice of words and construction
of frames can have significant consequences for legal disputes and, conse-
quently, our civil rights. 25 Some frames, such as the "nothing to hide"
argument, can take hold in certain contexts and can be very difficult to shake
or balance (pp. 21-32). This is why alternatives to the current narrative, like
those that Solove offers, are so important in the fight to frame privacy.
B. Nothing to Hide's Framing of Privacy
Solove's body of work displays a keen understanding of how the priva-
cy-security debate deeply influences government collection and use of
personal information. Nothing to Hide centers on a major problem of the
debate, which is that privacy too often needlessly loses out to security (p. 2).
One reason for this is that security is articulated as the need to protect "life
and limb," while the notion of privacy rights is more amorphous. Solove
finds that under the common narrative, people believe that they must sacri-
fice privacy in order to be more secure (pp. 21-24, 33). And advocates of
certain security measures make powerful arguments to encourage others to
accept this trade-off (p. 2).
This is where framing theory comes into play. Solove notes that people
have incorrectly framed the debate between privacy and security, portraying
the trade-off between these values as an all-or-nothing proposition (p. 2).
Nothing to Hide is based on the idea that the protection of privacy need not
be fatal to security measures; it merely demands oversight and regulation.
Solove asserts that the debate between privacy and security cannot progress
because the structure of the debate itself is fundamentally flawed (p. 2).
Solove demonstrates that he understands the importance of frames when
he states, "The way problems are conceived has a tremendous impact on the
legal and policy solutions used to solve them" (p. 24). Solove draws on his
philosophical guide, John Dewey, who observed, "A problem well put is
24. See, e.g., Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social
Movements: An Overview and Assessment, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 611 (2000); Sarah Kaplan,
Framing Contests: Strategy Making Under Uncertainty, 19 ORG. SCI. 729 (2008); Deana A.
Rohlinger, Framing the Abortion Debate: Organizational Resources, Media Strategies, and
Movement-Countermovement Dynamics, 43 SOc. Q. 479 (2002).
25. See PAUL M. SNIDERMAN ET AL., REASONING AND CHOICE 52 (1991) ("The effect
of framing is to prime values differently, establishing the salience of one or the other ....
[Thus] a majority of the public supports the rights of persons with AIDS when the issue is
framed [in a survey question] to accentuate civil liberties considerations-and supports ...
mandatory testing when the issue is framed to accentuate public health considerations.").
1026 [Vol. 111: 1021
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half-solved" (p. 24; footnote omitted). To that end, Solove offers numerous
arguments, which can be seen as "frames," that balance the privacy-security
debate by focusing on how privacy should be protected, rather than if it
should be protected (pp. 24-26).
Solove develops five dominant frames in the book. He conceptualizes pri-
vacy as a plurality of different things instead of simply "secrecy." He frames
many of the arguments espoused by security-side advocates as false dichoto-
mies. He characterizes judges as guardians and warns against excessive and
misguided deference to governmental entities in the privacy-security debate.
He describes much of the focus on whether privacy should be protected as
fruitless. Finally, Solove highlights that privacy is not just an individual val-
ue but also a societal one, and he accentuates the many benefits of privacy.
1. Privacy as a Plurality of Different Things Versus
Antiquated Notions of Privacy
One of Solove's principal goals in Nothing to Hide is to highlight the
fact that many of the dominant frames that are used in privacy and security
issues rely on antiquated conceptualizations of privacy. The first antiquated
notion of privacy is at the very core of the book: "When the government
gathers or analyzes personal information, many people say they're not wor-
ried. 'I've got nothing to hide,' they declare. 'Only if you're doing
something wrong should you worry, and then you don't deserve to keep it
private'" (p. 21). Solove claims that the "nothing to hide" argument is a
fallacy because it relies on the faulty assumption that privacy is about just
hiding bad things (pp. 26-29).
Privacy protects against more than just the harm that could result from
disclosing secrets. Additionally, privacy is not often threatened by a single
egregious act or lost in one fell swoop. Instead, Solove asserts that privacy is
"often eroded over time, little bits dissolving almost imperceptibly until we
finally begin to notice how much is gone" (p. 30). This "incremental harm"
frame can be used to counter the "nothing to hide" argument with respect to
government surveillance (p. 30). Incremental increases in surveillance ulti-
mately allow the government to collect massive dossiers of our "activities,
interests, reading habits, finances, and health" (p. 31).
No area of privacy law seems to rely on antiquated notions of privacy
more than the Fourth Amendment. According to Solove, the antiquated no-
tion that drives Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is that "something is
private only if it is completely secret" (p. 94). This "secrecy paradigm" is
out of touch with modern society because it dictates that if you share your
information with other people or entities, including internet service provid-
ers ("ISPs"), websites, or even trusted friends, you cannot expect privacy
(p. 100). Taken to its logical conclusion, the secrecy paradigm forces a
choice between living the life of a hermit or relinquishing our privacy and,
1027April 2013]
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in turn, a key protection against excessive government surveillance. 26 Solove
rightly notes that this approach is unsustainable in a world where online
activity, which necessarily involves disclosing information to others, is in-
creasingly a mandatory aspect of participating in society (p. 110).
The secrecy paradigm owes part of its entrenchment to another antiquity
of Fourth Amendment law known as the "third-party doctrine." This doc-
trine typically holds that "if [personal] information is in the hands of a third
party, then [a person has] no reasonable expectation of privacy in it-and as
a result, no Fourth Amendment protection" (p. 102). Solove unequivocally
argues that "the third party doctrine is one of the greatest threats to privacy
in our times" (p. 103).
The problems with the third-party doctrine in defining privacy as secrecy
become more evident with each newly adopted technology (Chapter Elev-
en). ISP records and cloud computing are unprotected by the Fourth
Amendment (pp. 105-06). As a result, Solove argues, "[a] company can't
meaningfully promise you confidentiality, because the government won't
respect that promise" (p. 107). Solove accurately pinpoints one of the main
problems with the third-party doctrine-its failure to account for the con-
cepts of confidentiality, promises, and contracts (pp. 108-09). As is
discussed in Part III, Solove could have explored these concepts further as a
response to the current problems with Fourth Amendment doctrine.
Confidentiality, promises, and contracts, which are not only critical to
businesses and commerce but are also important in our social lives, are en-
trenched in the law. So why are they irrelevant in determining privacy
expectations under the Fourth Amendment? The answer is that Fourth
Amendment doctrine generally requires a person disclosing information to
assume the risk of harm that might come from disclosure (p. 108). Those
subscribing to the "nothing to hide" argument might not have a problem
with assuming the risk. After all, if a person has nothing to hide, then gov-
ernment surveillance poses no threat.
Consider, however, social media such as Facebook. If Facebook users
are simply gossiping with their friends and posting pictures for hundreds to
see, should they be able to claim any privacy interest in information that the
government wants for security purposes? Given that these users are still vul-
nerable to privacy-related harms, the answer must be yes. Issues of data
protection, transparency, limits on use, and aggregation are no less vital
simply because the medium is "social." All online information is shared
26. One of Solove's most satisfying criticisms is a response to the argument that if you
want privacy, you should "just keep your data to yourself":
So don't use a credit card. Don't have cable. Don't use the Internet. Don't use the phone.
Don't have a bank account. Don't have insurance. Don't go to a hospital. Don't have a
job. Don't rent an apartment. Don't subscribe to any magazines or newspapers. Don't do
anything that creates a record.
In other words, go live as a hermit in a cabin on a mountaintop. That's where the Fourth
Amendment still protects you.
P. 110.
1028 [Vol. 111: 1021
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with someone, if only the user's ISP and the recipient website. By reframing
privacy as a plurality of different values rather than simply secrecy, the de-
bate no longer hinges on whether a person has completely concealed the
information. Rather, people can have a more nuanced discussion about the
many different privacy interests implicated by the government's collection
and use of information. Additionally, judges and lawmakers who embrace a
pluralistic conception of privacy can then consider varying degrees of pro-
tection, from thin to robust.
2. False Dichotomies
One problem with the current all-or-nothing frames used in the privacy
and security debate is that they are false dichotomies. According to Solove,
the common refrain is that we can have privacy or security, but in many in-
stances, we can't have both (pp. 33-37). Solove contends that this argument
is flawed because sacrificing privacy does not necessarily make us more
secure. Indeed, many security measures do not invade privacy, and there is
no direct relationship between the effectiveness of a security measure and
the amount of liberty (p. 34). As I argue in Part III, Solove also could have
argued that in many instances, such as certain settings involving encryption,
security protections can actually ensure privacy.
According to Solove, the problem with balancing privacy against securi-
ty is that too often people assume that an entire security measure is in the
balance, even though protecting privacy seldom negates a security measure
altogether (p. 37). Recall that framing is effective not only because it makes
some aspects of a dispute salient but also because it hides some logical as-
pects as a result. 27 Here, the all-or-nothing frame obscures the option for
judicial oversight of a security measure to ensure due process that would
only incrementally burden security while protecting privacy. The only way
to accurately evaluate the costs of protecting privacy is to reject the all-or-
nothing frame.
Unfortunately, the false dichotomies in the privacy and security debate
are unlikely to dissipate anytime soon. Consider the increasing use of un-
manned aircraft, often called drones, for surveillance, which will likely be
the next battlefield for privacy and security.28 Privacy advocates have object-
ed to the use of drones for relentless and pervasive surveillance of the
American public.29 Framed as an all-or-nothing debate, advocates of drone
27. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., M. Ryan Calo, The Drone as Privacy Catalyst, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE
29, 30 (2011) ("[Drones] threaten to perfect the art of surveillance. Drones are capable of
finding or following a specific person. They can fly patterns in search of suspicious activities
or hover over a location in wait .... In addition to high-resolution cameras and microphones,
drones can be equipped with thermal imaging and the capacity to intercept wireless communi-
cations.").
29. See, e.g., Jennifer Lynch, Are Drones Watching You?, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER




surveillance might argue that it would be harmful to outlaw drones just
because they might cause privacy problems. Drones simply have too much
potential to dramatically improve the efficiency of law enforcement. Privacy
advocates might respond by seeking to keep drones out of the skies. Both
responses would be too extreme.
Solove's false-dichotomy frame accentuates a possible middle ground.
The government could effectively use drones while still respecting privacy
by limiting the duration of observation, the focus subject, and the amount of
information collected or retained, and by subjecting the use of drones to the
process of judicial oversight. The government could engage in long-term or
general searches, seen as anathema in Fourth Amendment doctrine,3" on a
limited basis and only in extreme circumstances, such as riots and mass at-
tacks on the public, and with obligations to incorporate certain data
protections, such as restricted data retention rules.
31
3. Misguided Deference (and Judges as Guardians)
Because the "nothing to hide" frame concerns the appropriateness of an
intelligence-gathering measure, it deftly obscures the antecedent question in
the privacy and security debate, which is whether the measure is even effec-
tive. To help address the question of efficacy, Solove asks why judges give
so much deference to executive decisions. Solove states, "Deference is a
major problem when it comes to balancing security and privacy. Although
courts should not take a know-it-all attitude, they shouldn't defer on such a
critical question as a security measure's effectiveness" (pp. 39-40). Instead,
Solove proposes that courts and lawmakers require justifications from ex-
perts for the security measures that they advocate (p. 41). After all, the point
of judicial review is to scrutinize the actions of government officials, not to
accept their authority without question.
Solove draws on one of the most compelling and established descrip-
tions of the judiciary to support his claim of misguided deference, which is
that judges are guardians of an individual's privacy and civil liberties (pp.
41-42). As such, they are well equipped to ensure the balance between secu-
rity and liberty. Although this balance might not allow the maximization of
security, Solove poignantly observes that accepting less than complete secu-
rity "is one of the costs of living in a democracy as opposed to an
authoritarian political regime.
32
While it might seem that Solove views the courts as the most appropri-
ate architects of privacy and security law, this is not the case. In the
30. E.g., Lloyd L. Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REv.
47, 50 (1974) ("The central theme of the [Fourth] [A]mendment is its prohibition against
general searches, the evil that its authors had foremost in mind.").
31. I thank Ryan Calo for this insightful point.
32. P. 41. Solove goes on to assert that the judiciary gives too much deference to the
executive branch in exercising its war powers, pp. 42-46, and gives too much deference to
legislators, who have muddled privacy law in many areas such as electronic surveillance. Pp.
165-66.
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misguided-deference frame, Solove continues his crusade against the all-or-
nothing tenor of the privacy and security debate by tasking the courts with
both rigor and deference. The branches of government, he suggests, should
challenge each other and compromise when possible when confronted with
a problematic security measure. Solove's vision is not that judges create
their own ideal security measures but rather that they evaluate the security
measures of the executive and legislative branches to force them to justify
their policies (pp. 40-41).
4. Fruitless Focus
Much of Nothing to Hide is dedicated to the proposition that privacy-
protection regimes are often such a mess because they focus on the wrong
issues. This misguided focus can lead to perverse or absurd results.
Ironically, one of Solove's core arguments is that "the Fourth Amendment
would better protect privacy if the Supreme Court stopped focusing on it"
(p. 113). More specifically, Solove proposes abandoning the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" test, which has vexed nearly everyone since its
inception (pp. 114-15): "Instead, we should focus on the practical
consequences of Fourth Amendment coverage .... [W]henever a particular
government information-gathering activity creates problems of reasonable
significance, the Fourth Amendment should require regulation and oversight"
(pp. 115-16). By increasing the salience of the energy wasted in trying to
determine whether information is private, and thus subject to protection, the
fruitless-focus frame advances the discussion by assuming a broad Fourth
Amendment applicability; it asks how an information-gathering activity or
security measure should be regulated so as to balance privacy protections
with security protections.
33
5. Privacy's Values and Goals
One of the most problematic aspects of the "nothing to hide" argument
is that it buries privacy's underlying and associated values by focusing on
the need for security. Solove remedies this by framing privacy as a core First
Amendment concept and a tool to effectuate due process and equality. For
example, Solove argues that while the Fourth Amendment regulates how the
government can gather information about individuals, the collection and use
of such information can also affect an individual's First Amendment rights,
including the freedoms of speech, association, thought, and belief (p. 146).
The knowledge that the government is gathering information about an
individual could inhibit that individual from exercising her First Amendment
33. Another example of the fruitless-focus frame involves the hastily enacted USA
PATRIOT Act. Many view this statute as the law that destroyed privacy in America. Solove,
however, argues that "all the hoopla has been focused too much on the Patriot Act itself and
not enough on the law more generally. Many of the complaints about the Patriot Act relate to
problems with the law that existed long before the act was ever passed." P. 156. Instead,
Solove argues that electronic-surveillance law must be entirely reworked. P. 156.
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rights. This reluctance of expression is commonly known as a "chilling ef-
fect," and scholars have recognized it as something that the First
Amendment seeks to protect against.3 4 Solove argues that since the First and
Fourth Amendments share a common history, and the Fourth Amendment no
longer adequately protects against government information gathering that
threatens to chill speech, association, and intellectual inquiry, "the First
Amendment should be considered alongside the Fourth Amendment as a
source of criminal procedure" (pp. 146-52).
Given the prominence of the First Amendment in policy debates, this
frame could be extremely powerful. Recall that people are more willing to
tolerate rallies by controversial hate groups when such rallies are framed as
free speech issues rather than disruptions of the public order.35 Later in the
book, Solove notes the threat that government data mining-that is, amass-
ing personal data about individuals to create profiles for later use by the
government-poses to First Amendment-protected activities (pp. 189-90).
Solove observes that information gathering might inhibit protected activi-
ties, such as reading, socializing, and even merely using internet search
engines (p. 189).
Perhaps the most important frame that Solove offers with respect to un-
derlying values is the conceptualization of privacy as a societal, not
individual, right. According to Solove, since the current frame balances the
safety of society versus the privacy of an individual, the security interest
almost always wins (p. 47). Solove argues that a society without privacy
protection would be oppressive and that, accordingly, we must consider the
social value of privacy as a civil liberty (Chapter Five).
6. Other Frames
One of the most effective frames employed by Solove is "security thea-
ter," (p. 44) a term that security expert Bruce Schneier popularized.
3 6
According to Schneier, "Security theater refers to security measures that
make people feel more secure without doing anything to actually improve
their security."37 Schneier gives as an example the practice of checking for
34. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the
"Chilling Effect", 58 B.U. L. REv. 685, 688 (1978) ("[T]he chilling effect doctrine recog-
nizes the fact that the legal system is imperfect and mandates the formulation of legal rules
that reflect our preference for errors made in favor of free speech."). Neil Richards has
argued that individuals need what he has described as "intellectual privacy" in order to
protect our intellectual freedom to think without state oversight or interference. See Neil
Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/symposiumlpapers20l2/richards.pdf ("Surveillance is harm-
ful because it can chill the exercise of our civil liberties, and because it gives the watcher
power over the watched .... Such intellectual surveillance is particularly dangerous because it
can cause people not to experiment with new, controversial, or deviant ideas.").
35. Nelson et al., supra note 3, at 574.
36. See Bruce Schreier, Beyond Security Theater, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Nov. 13,
2009, 6:52 AM), http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/1 l/beyond.security.html.
37. Id.
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photo IDs in office buildings. He states, "No-one has ever explained why
verifying that someone has a photo ID provides any actual security, but it
looks like security to have a uniformed guard-for-hire looking at ID cards."
38
Solove gives as an additional example the New York City subway search
program, whereby armed guards randomly searched a relatively small num-
ber of subway passengers. According to Solove, this security measure was
largely symbolic because it involved only a miniscule fraction of the sub-
way's daily passengers, and a potential terrorist could have easily avoided
the searches by simply getting off at a different station (p. 39).
Of course, security theater has some utility-it can lower public anxiety
over security threats because the security measure is highly visible. But
Solove rejects security theater, stating, "Meaningful protection of rights re-
quires that they be sacrificed only when security measures are really
effective. Rights shouldn't be sacrificed for lies, no matter how noble the
intention behind the lies might be. ' 39 Solove's critique of security theater
seems appropriate, given some of the problematic approaches to security
today. Many Americans have objected to the increasingly invasive and dubi-
ous nature of airport security as well as the money spent on questionable
security technologies, such as the more than $30 million spent on "puffer"
machines, which remain in storage because they are unreliable.
40 Security
theater could also be part of the justification for ubiquitous public surveil-
lance cameras, which, as Solove explains in Chapter 18, are not very
effective in lowering crime. Apparently even the theatrical aspects of the
cameras are a failure, as Solove notes that the numerous public cameras de-
ployed in the United Kingdom have failed to reduce people's fear of crime
(p. 180).
The final part of Nothing to Hide is dedicated to how the law should cope
with changing technology. This section also develops new frames to counter
the current structure of the debate surrounding privacy and changing technol-
ogy. For example, where advocates of new security technologies, such as
biometrics, would call the opponents of these measures Luddites, Solove
would describe the opponents as rightfully cautious (pp. 199-205). Where
advocates of ubiquitous video surveillance argue that you should not expect
any privacy in public, Solove frames the issue as one of effectiveness. He
38. Id.
39. P 45. Solove memorably states, "If we give up some privacy for security, we should
at least get our money's worth, not placebos or empty symbolic measures." P 45.
40. See, e.g., Thomas Frank, It's the Last Gasp for Bomb-Sensing 'Puffers'at Airports,
USA TODAY, May 21, 2009, http://usatoday30.usatoday.comtravellflights/
200 9 -O5-2 0-
puffersN.htm?csp; Kip Hawley, Why Airport Security Is Broken-And How to Fix It, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 15, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303815404577
335783535660546.html ("The relationship between the public and the TSA has become too
poisonous to be sustained."); Confrontation with TSA Agent Leaves Grandpa's Ashes on
Floor, THE INDY CHANNEL (June 25, 2012), http://www.theindychannel.com/news/31224633/
detail.html (quoting a man whose grandfather's ashes were spilled at a TSA security check-
point, "I want an apology from TSA. I want an apology from the lady who opened the jar and




wonders who will watch the watchers and cites evidence that surveillance
cameras only seem to shift crime to areas that the cameras do not cover (pp.
180-81).
The frames that Solove offers are essential to help balance the privacy
and security debate. The government can appropriately and proportionately
implement security measures only when such measures are not framed as
false dichotomies or by antiquated notions of privacy. In this way, security
measures can become more efficient and less invasive of privacy. However,
Nothing to Hide does not offer a complete solution to the problems inherent
in the privacy and security debate. The book consciously sacrifices technical
minutiae and explicit details to focus on general arguments and principles
(p. vii). This trade-off makes Nothing to Hide one of the most accessible
books on the privacy and security debate. But empirical support and explicit
details are eventually necessary to fully embrace Solove's arguments.
II. SECURITY-SIDE FRAMES
Although Nothing to Hide does an excellent job critiquing the current
structure of the privacy and security debate, a few of the "security side"
frames deserve further exploration. Many proponents of security measures
frame the major issue of the debate as one of simplicity and feasibility. Be-
cause Nothing to Hide offers general remedies instead of highly detailed
solutions, Solove's arguments are vulnerable to one of the most common
attacks on many proposals to protect privacy-blurring the bright line. For
concepts such as the third-party doctrine, the current distinction between
protected and unprotected information is clear and largely ascertainable.
Advocates of the third-party doctrine, such as Orin Kerr, extol its clarity and
feasibility in justifying its place in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 41
When framed as an issue of practicality, concepts like the third-party
doctrine might seem more attractive than some of Solove's proposals, which
might be difficult for law enforcement officials to follow because they are
either generalized or highly context-dependent. For example, Solove's
pragmatic approach for examining the legitimacy of a security measure in-
cludes vague questions such as "Does it work well?" and "Does it cause any
problems for privacy and civil liberties?" (p. 208). Solove also argues that
the Fourth Amendment should dictate that searches are unreasonable in all
situations in which the government gathers personal information and that
information-gathering activity creates a problem that is not addressed with
some form of regulation or oversight (p. 122).
But these proposals require additional guidance to be effectively imple-
mented. When exactly does a security measure work well? When the
measure has a high success rate or a low error rate? Is Solove contemplating
normative or legal privacy problems as part of his pragmatic approach?
Must the problems contemplated by Solove rise to the level of a clear legal
41. See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MIcH. L. REv. 561,
581-83 (2009).
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violation or just a cognizable harm? Lawmakers, courts, and other relevant
stakeholders are certainly capable of answering these questions. Fourth
Amendment doctrine and other bodies of law have refined and articulated
their boundaries and nuances over time, and Solove's pragmatic approach
could evolve the same way. But until it does, supporters of the status quo
might view Solove's proposal as a threat to bright-line rules such as the
third-party doctrine, which, for all its problems, is relatively easy to imple-
ment in practice.
Another security-side frame that deserves additional attention is the
conceptualization of security measures as an ongoing process. Much of
Solove's critique of privacy-invasive security measures is that they are inef-
fective (pp. 38-46). One counter to this argument could be to concede the
initial ineffectiveness of security measures and argue that the only way such
measures will improve is through trial, error, and innovation. If governments
do not have some flexibility in the implementation and improvement of a
security measure, that inflexibility might foreclose the possibility of a more
effective, and perhaps less privacy-invasive, security measure.
For example, later in the book, Solove tackles the problems of predictive
data mining-that is, the use of data in personal profiles to make predictive
determinations about one's future behavior. Solove gives as an example
denying someone the ability to travel due to a predictive judgment based on
previously collected data that the person is a security threat (pp. 196-97).
Even selecting someone for extra scrutiny could be a form of predictive data
mining, a technique that Solove argues comes with more costs than benefits
(p. 196).
Solove's problem with predictive data mining is that it destroys too
much privacy for such a speculative return. He assails the technique's ex-
tremely small likelihood of success, stating, "Finding a terrorist among the
millions who travel each day is like finding a needle in a haystack. An indi-
vidual fitting a profile may be statistically likelier to be a terrorist than
someone who doesn't fit it, but the chances are still very small." (p. 197).
This is an efficacy and cost-benefit argument, which leaves open the coun-
terargument that more accurate data mining could justify invasions of
privacy. If so, proponents of data mining might argue that the government
must be given the flexibility to refine its algorithms to make the trade-off of
privacy more reasonable.
For example, what would the data-mining debate look like if a particular
technique could accurately identify a threat 99 percent of the time with a
false negative rate of less than 1 percent?42 Even if such a low failure rate
were possible, rigorous trial and error in "real-world" settings would likely be
required for this kind of accuracy. Thus, Solove wisely incorporates prin-
ciples of autonomy, antidiscrimination, freedom of expression, and other
42. A false negative is "[a] negative test result when the attribute for which the subject
is being tested actually exists in that subject." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 292 (2d ed. 2004).
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civil liberties into his critique of data mining to balance the "necessary flex-
ibility" frame that is enabled by a cost-benefit analysis.43
HI. ADDITIONAL FRAMES
Nothing to Hide is an excellent touchstone on which to begin reframing
the privacy and security debate. However, other frames not fully explored in
the book could also advance Solove's general thesis, including the similari-
ties between privacy and security, a more pronounced focus on
confidentiality, and the importance of the concept of obscurity in our every-
day lives. Solove has well explored some of these concepts, such as
confidentiality, in other works, while those in the privacy and security de-
bate have not yet fully embraced other concepts, such as obscurity.
A. The Commonalities Between Privacy and Security
Solove could support his narrative that privacy and security are not op-
posing forces by detailing their similarities. Instead of focusing on security
as "national security" or "crime prevention," which predominate the book,
Solove could focus on how people secure their own information from oth-
ers. In this way, he could make the commonalities between privacy and
security salient and, thus, less adversarial in the broader debate.
Security and privacy often coexist. In many instances, the security of
personal information actually guarantees its privacy, even if privacy was
merely an ancillary benefit resulting from a security measure. Consider en-
cryption technologies, which allow users to keep a communication secure
by concealing the contents of a message or transmission. 4 Encryption pro-
grams such as Pretty Good Privacy allow users to protect the privacy of their
personal information by ensuring that only authorized users can access the
information; in other words, users protect their private information by secur-
ing it.45
43. Solove addresses but does not fully explore these themes:
People shouldn't be systematically treated worse than other people for factors they have
no power to change .... [A traveler] shouldn't have to refrain from doing things he's le-
gally entitled to do [based on his behavior profile]. He shouldn't have to answer to
government officials for who he is or what he does. Otherwise, he's being treated no
longer as an equal but as someone who is inherently suspicious. No law-abiding citizen
should be treated this way.
P. 197.
44. For two books that provide detailed histories of the advancement of encryption
technology, see STEVEN LEVY, CRYPTO: HOW THE CODE REBELS BEAT THE GOVERNMENT-
SAVING PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2001), and SIMON SINGH, THE CODE BOOK (1999).
45. Margaret Rouse, Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), SEARCHSECURITY, http:/l
searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/Pretty-Good-Privacy (last updated Sept. 2005); cf
Derek E. Bambauer, Privacy Versus Security, J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 2013
(manuscript at 4)), available at http://papers.ssm.comsol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2208824
(citing literature that recognizes "that privacy and security (as implemented through cryptog-
raphy) are different, though complimentary").
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Of course, this security means that information important for national
security purposes might be unavailable to the government. The U.S. gov-
ernment has argued that it needs access to encryption keys for this very
reason.46 Here, encryption can also allow users to protect information that
needs in order to remain secret to prevent crime or for national security
purposes. Indeed, encryption is regularly employed by the government and
other third parties to protect classified information.47 Thus, one could
frame the argument that encryption should be weakened within the broad-
er concept of "security," not just obtaining incriminating information from
guilty parties. In these instances, asking individuals to give up their privacy
can be tantamount to compromising security, which makes the request to
sacrifice privacy for a different kind of security seem perverse.
B. Confidentiality
Solove is one of the most prolific modern thinkers on confidentiality
law.48 While he mentions the importance of confidentiality in Nothing to
Hide, he leaves the concept's potential as a frame in the privacy and security
debate largely untapped, particularly as an alternative to the third-party doc-
trine. Solove states, "The third party doctrine fails to comprehend the
concept of confidentiality-as well as the concept of a promise" (p. 108).
Solove observes that although nongovernmental actors generally respect
promises of confidentiality, the third-party doctrine ensures that even a writ-
ten contract is not sufficient to give people an expectation of privacy (p.
108). Solove then poignantly notes, "But promises and contracts are the
foundation of modem civil society. If people couldn't rely on them, business
and commerce would grind to a halt. Yet when it comes to privacy, the U.S.
Supreme Court thinks that promises and contracts don't matter."4 9 At this
point, Solove's exploration of confidentiality gives way to other faults with
the third-party doctrine.
46. E.g., A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper
Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709 (1995) (exploring the "Clipper Chip," a
federal encryption standard in which the government would retain a copy of the encryption
key in an escrow).
47. E.g., NSA Suite B Cryptography, NAT'L SECURITY AGENCY, http://www.nsa.gov/ia/
programs/suitebcryptography/ (last updated Sept. 24, 2012); see, e.g., EAR Controls for Items
that Use Encryption, U.S. BUREAU OF INDUSTRY & SECURITY, http://www.bis.doc.gov/
encryption/ (last visited July 9, 2012).
48. See, e.g., Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy's Other Path: Recovering
the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123 (2007) [hereinafter Richards & Solove, Privacy's
Other Path]; Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser's Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy,
98 CALIF. L. REv. 1887 (2010); Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech
and Civil Liability, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 1650 (2009).
49. Pp. 108-09. Solove also points out the hypocrisy of the government's promising to
protect the confidentiality of census answers in light of the third-party doctrine, stating, "The




But confidentiality law could play a larger role in this debate, as an al-
temative to the third-party doctrine and as part of Solove's general proposal
that the Fourth Amendment should apply whenever government information
gathering causes privacy problems." Confidentiality law is quite old and
well developed. 1 Indeed, it predates the American conceptualization of pri-
vacy law. 2 Not only does this entrenched concept make courts' reliance on
the third-party doctrine seem absurd by contrast, but confidentiality also sits
at the ready as an ample body of law from which one can determine whether
information is deserving of protections.
C. Obscurity
The "nothing to hide" argument and the "no privacy in public" argument
completely disregard one of the most important concepts in our social
lives-obscurity.53 This concept, which has been strangely ignored or unde-
veloped by courts, lawmakers, scholars, and other policy stakeholders,
supports Solove's argument that privacy is about more than hiding and se-
crecy. Obscurity-which in its simplest form is a state of being unknown by
others, though not necessarily completely hidden-helps explain why most
individuals would balk at having their every public activity continually mon-
itored even if they might not expect their activities in public to be a
complete secret.5 4 Obscurity generally refers to the lack of knowledge or
understanding of a person or piece of information.
55
An individual is obscure to an observer if the observer does not possess or
comprehend critical information needed to make sense of the individual.
Personal identity, social connections, and personal or situational context
are examples of such critical information. Without this information, the
observer has a limited ability to make sense of the actions and utterances
of the individual.
5 6
Obscurity explains why we are comfortable talking about personal in-
formation in a crowded restaurant and posting personal information to a
50. See pp. 121-22, 208.
51. Richards & Solove, Privacy's Other Path, supra note 48.
52. Id. at 133.
53. Portions of this section have been adapted from the author's previous posts at the
website for the Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law School and
www.usvjones.com. See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog, Three Cheers for Obscurity, an Unspoken
Beneficiary of United States v. Jones, THE CENTER FOR INTERNET & Soc'Y (Feb. 2,
2012, 9:59 AM), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2012/02/three-cheers-obscurity-unspoken-
beneficiary-united-states-v-jones; Woodrow Hartzog, United States v. Jones and the Need to
Embrace Obscurity, USVJONES.COM, http://usvjones.com/2012/06/02/united-states-v-jones-
and-the-need-to-embrace-obscurity/#more-156 (last visited Oct. 5, 2012).
54. Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CA-
LIF. L. REv. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 4-8), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid= 1597745.
55. Id. at 4.
56. Id. at5.
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restricted number of people within online communities. Indeed, a significant
portion of our everyday interaction places us into a zone of obscurity, where
our identity and personal context are unknown to those we interact with or
with whom we share common space.57 Socialization typically depends on
some ability to manage the accessibility and comprehension of social ex-
changes by outsiders, the loss of which can be quite harmful.
58
The recent Supreme Court decision in United States v. Jones illustrates
the need for the obscurity frame in privacy doctrine.59 On its face, Jones
stands for the proposition that the government's installation of a GPS device
on a target's vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's
movements, constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.60 The decision was
unanimous on this narrow point, though the concurring opinions by Justices
Sotomayor and Alito are more remarkable than the majority opinion because
they question the conventional wisdom surrounding the use of ubiquitous
surveillance technologies. 61 Because the majority opinion focused on the
attachment of the device to the car, it avoided tackling the much more diffi-
cult issue of whether individuals can have privacy in "public." Perhaps the
obscurity frame can advance the dialogue on this issue.
Neither the majority opinion nor the concurring opinions in Jones explicit-
ly reference the concept of obscurity. Justices Sotomayor and Alito, however,
seem to indicate in their concurring opinions a willingness to protect obscure
personal information. 62 An embrace of obscurity would be significant because
the concept can alleviate the inflexibility of the third-party doctrine and, more
importantly, loosen the public-private dichotomy's grip on Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence.
But justices are unlikely to embrace obscurity overnight. After the Katz
v. United States decision,63 Fourth Amendment decisions have centered on
whether individuals had a "reasonable expectation of privacy" (pp. 98-99,
57. Id. Consider how many unidentified people interact with each other in restaurants,
office buildings, public transportation, and the like.
58. IRWIN ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (1975); ERVING
GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959); ERVING GOFFMAN, BE-
HAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES: NOTES ON THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF GATHERINGS (1966);
SANDRA PETRONIO, BOUNDARIES OF PRIVACY: DIALECTICS OF DISCOURSE (2002); Erving
Goffman, Felicity's Condition, 89 AM. J. Soc. 1, 51 (1983); Geoffrey A. Fowler, When the
Most Personal Secrets Get Outed on Facebook, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2012, at Al,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10000872396390444165804578008740578200224.html (de-
scribing the harmful effects of inadvertently disclosing information known only to a small
group on the social network site Facebook).
59. See 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 963-64.
60. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 (majority opinion); id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
61. See id. at 957 (Sotomayor J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment).
62. See id. at 954-57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 963-64.
63. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (concluding that "The Govern-
ment's activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's words violated the
privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a
'search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.").
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Chapter Twelve). Yet it is obscurity that lies at the heart of many critical
Fourth Amendment disputes. For example, the desire for privacy in public
can be accurately refrained as a preference for or expectation of obscurity.
Critiques that the third-party doctrine and the "secrecy paradigm" are too
harsh reflect an implicit preference for the protection of information that is
shared with some but not all.64
In Jones, Justice Sotomayor proposed that it might be time to abandon
the third-party doctrine precisely because she was not ready to accept that
the limited disclosure of information to others automatically abrogated an
individual's Fourth Amendment rights.65 Sotomayor's position is, in essence,
a recognition of maintaining the hidden nature of some kinds of infor-
mation, which, while known by some, is likely to remain obscure to most.
66
Appreciation for obscurity can also be found in the so-called "mosaic
theory" of the Fourth Amendment, which has been articulated as the ap-
proach "by which courts evaluate a collective sequence of government
activity as an aggregated whole to consider whether the sequence amounts
to a search. ' 67 In the aggregate, our day-to-day activities create a revealing
picture of our entire lives. 61 Yet, when they are considered in isolation, these
pieces of information are less likely to reveal sensitive details of one's life.
These discrete pieces of information are often fully understood by only a
few, known to some, accessible to many others, and obscure to the general
public. Individuals have an interest in ensuring that this information is hard
to find and understand. The difficulty of discovery and comprehension pro-
vides for obscurity, which is destroyed when this information is ubiquitously
collected and aggregated.
69
64. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 42 (2004).
65. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("[I]t may be necessary
to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in infor-
mation voluntarily disclosed to third parties.").
66. See id.
67. Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, I I 1 MICH. L. REV. 311,
313 (2012) ("Identifying Fourth Amendment searches requires analyzing police actions over
time as a collective 'mosaic' of surveillance; the mosaic can count as a collective Fourth
Amendment search even though the individual steps taken in isolation do not.").
68. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("GPS monitoring generates a
precise, comprehensive record of a person's public movements that reflects a wealth of detail
about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.").
69. For instance, in United States v. Maynard, Judge Ginsburg stated the following:
The whole of one's movements over the course of a month is not constructively exposed
to the public because, like a rap sheet, that whole reveals far more than the individual
movements it comprises. The difference is not one of degree but of kind, for no single
journey reveals the habits and patterns that mark the distinction between a day in the life
and a way of life, nor the departure from a routine that, like the dog that did not bark in
the Sherlock Holmes story, may reveal even more.
As with the "mosaic theory" often invoked by the Government in cases involving nation-
al security information, "What may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great
moment to one who has a broad view of the scene."
615 F.3d 544, 561-62 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citations omitted), aff'd in part, Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945.
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Justice Sotomayor's concurring opinion in Jones can be seen as recep-
tive to the concept of obscurity. In Jones, she stated that she would take into
account the ubiquity of GPS monitoring when considering whether an indi-
vidual had a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the entirety of an
individual's public movements.7 ° Specifically, Justice Sotomayor stated
that she "would ask whether people reasonably expect that their move-
ments will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the
Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious
beliefs, sexual habits, and so on."71
Justice Alito's concurring opinion also implicitly valued obscurity by
focusing on the length of monitoring, rather than the majority's focus on
trespass, to find a Fourth Amendment search.7" Alito noted that individuals
value and rely on the difficulty of finding personal information.73
The privacy value inherent in the practical difficulties of collecting and
understanding information has previously been recognized by the Supreme
Court in U.S. Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press.74 In that case, the Court recognized the privacy interest in main-
taining the "practical obscurity" of geographically dispersed public records
that were later aggregated into comprehensive "rap sheets."75
In Jones, Justice Alito noted that society has traditionally expected that
others, including law enforcement agents, would refrain from continuous,
long-term surveillance, if for no other reason than that such monitoring
would be cost prohibitive.7 6 Following this rationale, individuals expect and
need most of the details of their lives to remain ephemeral. Long-term con-
tinuous surveillance reverses society's expectations by ensuring that most of
the details of an individual's life are collected during the surveillance peri-
od. In other words, long-term, continuous surveillance results in the loss of
an individual's obscurity.
Like privacy, obscurity is an expansive concept. But one can refine it for
use in various contexts. For example, in previous research, my coauthor and
70. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
73. Id. at 963 ("In the pre-computer age, the greatest protections of privacy were nei-
ther constitutional nor statutory, but practical. Traditional surveillance for any extended period
of time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken.").
74. 489 U.S. 749, 770 (1989).
75. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 780 ("The privacy interest in maintaining the practi-
cal obscurity of rap-sheet information will always be high. When the subject of such a rap
sheet is a private citizen and when the information is in the Government's control as a compi-
lation, rather than as a record of 'what the Government is up to,' the privacy interest protected
by [the personal privacy exemption to the Freedom of Information Act] is in fact at its apex
76. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[S]ociety's expec-
tation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not-and indeed, in the main,
simply could not-secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual's
car for a very long period.").
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I have conceptualized online obscurity as information that "exists in a con-
text missing one or more key factors that are essential to discovery or
comprehension."77 We proposed that there were four factors to online obscu-
rity: (1) search visibility, (2) unprotected access, (3) identification, and (4)
clarity.78 Fourth Amendment doctrine could look to the degree of obscurity
of online information instead of asking whether it was public or private.
Framing privacy as obscurity would help resolve the issue of privacy in
online information that has been disclosed to others. Information that is of-
ten perceived as "public," such as information disclosed to a select few via
the social web, can still be obscure. If courts looked to the obscurity of in-
formation, a determination of whether the information was "publicly
available" would only be one part of a more nuanced inquiry. An offline
conceptualization of obscurity might vary from its online counterpart, per-
haps by adhering closer to the Supreme Court's conceptualization of
"practical obscurity" in Reporters Committee.79 Regardless, it is becoming
increasingly difficult for courts and lawmakers to justify ignoring a concept
that is vital to social interaction.
The inquiry as to whether individuals can have privacy in public often
feels intractable. Courts and lawmakers have strained to articulate a valid
privacy interest in information that others could theoretically access yet are
unlikely to find or understand. A refined concept of obscurity could be uti-
lized as a frame to respond to the "nothing to hide" argument by
demonstrating that most aspects of a person's life are, to some degree, hid-
den and as a consequence, relatively protected.
CONCLUSION
The "nothing to hide" frame employed in the privacy and security de-
bate has for far too long demanded the wrong kind of justification from
critics of a government's security measures. When the question is effectively
framed as "How long have you wanted to protect criminals?," critics are
asked to submit to a false dichotomy between staying safe or protecting
lawbreakers. Daniel Solove's Nothing to Hide: The False Tradeoff Between
Privacy and Security will help change the structure of this debate.
This important book offers many new ways to frame the approach to
privacy and security, which will help restore balance to this important policy
conversation. By framing secrecy as an antiquated notion of privacy, judges
as guardians of our civil liberties, privacy as a societal value, and poor over-
sight of security measures as an issue of misguided deference, Solove
provides a roadmap for those who seek to respond to arguments such as
"I've got nothing to hide."
Solove's critique of the way the privacy and security debate has been
framed is empowering. A focus on framing enables additional critiques be-
77. Hartzog & Stutzman, supra note 54.
78. Id.
79. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 780.
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yond what is included in Nothing to Hide. Some examples of additional cri-
tiques include the commonalities of privacy and security, the disclosure of
information as an issue of confidentiality, and public surveillance as a threat
to our cherished obscurity, rather than a threat to some vague and often un-
tenable expectation of privacy. One can see the utility of Solove's frames
and the additional frames proposed in this Review in many current privacy
and security disputes involving social media, drones, and GPS technologies,
including the recent Supreme Court opinion United States v. Jones.
Nothing to Hide is concise and direct. Although it lacks the technical
minutiae and empirics found in many law and policy books, it is destined to
become an important work for those who seek to understand how privacy
and security relate to each other in our modem world. In rejecting the preor-
dained conclusion that privacy must give way to security, Solove reframes
the structure of the debate as one aimed at maximizing security while
providing the proper oversight and limits on government surveillance. These
restrictions are necessary to protect our privacy, a concept that has always
been about more than just hiding.
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